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ABSTRACT PAGE
Social contract theory (Cosmides, 1989) hypothesizes that the presence of social
exchange content activates the evolved cheater detection mechanism, which is specifically
designed to monitor for violations of socially prescribed rules or contracts. More recently,
Yamagishi (Yamagishi, 1998; Kiyonari & Yamagishi, 2000) has proposed a connection
between general levels of trust towards others and sensitivity to information regarding the
untrustworthiness of a potential interaction partner. The current study was designed to
integrate social contract theory and Yamagishi’s work on trust. It was hypothesized that if
generalized trust influences the level of suspicion people hold towards others, then this
should in turn influence the cheater detection mechanism. Yamagishi has also proposed
that trust develops out of an individual’s socio-cultural experiences which can be
operationalizied as social intelligence. This prediction that social intelligence influences the
relationship between trust and cheater detection was also tested.
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Trust and Cheater Detection: Evolved Cognitive Mechanisms for Social Exchange
For over 25 years, evolutionary psychologists have been investigating the
neurocognitive adaptations for human cooperation. One aspect of human cooperation in
particular, social exchange, has received a large amount of attention from evolutionaryminded researchers (Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Fiddick, Cosmides &
Tooby, 2000; Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992). Social exchange can be defined as an
interaction between two parties where one party provides a benefit to the other with the
expectation that the act will be reciprocated. Social exchange is a broad category,
including explicit or implicit agreements, immediate or deferred exchange, and may take
place between individuals or more complex social structures (Cosmides, 2005). Thus
social exchanges can take the form of a simple transfer of goods from one individual to
another, or a more complicated relationship between an individual and a social
institution. The common element present in all social exchanges is the presence of costs
and benefits for all parties involved in the interaction.
Historically, evolutionary social exchange research can be divided into two
methodological paradigms: the Wason task and the prisoner’s dilemma. These two
research paradigms, both designed to address the issue of social exchange, focus on two
separate but related adaptive problems. In order for reciprocal exchange to evolve, at
least two conditions must be satisfied. First, individuals must be motivated to cooperate.
That is, reciprocal exchange cannot take place if no one is interested in forming such
relationships (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). Second, once an exchange relationship has
been formed, involved parties must possess the ability to detect and punish cheaters
(Axelrod, 1984; Trivers, 1971). The prisoner’s dilemma is well suited to testing
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hypotheses regarding how and when individuals will cooperate, while the Wason task is
preferable when studying how and when people detect cheating.
Although both the motivation to cooperate and the ability to guard against
exploitation are equally important (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992), research on cheater
detection has overshadowed much of the prisoner’s dilemma research on the motivation
to engage in social exchange (Kiyonari & Yamagishi, 2000). The primary reason for this
imbalance has to do with the particularly robust findings in the Wason task literature
regarding the conditions under which humans effectively detect potential instances of
cheating. Since 1985, Cosmides and colleagues have proposed and tested hypotheses
regard the detection of cheating within social exchanges. This research program has led
to the articulation and development of social contract theory (SCT). Social contract
theory starts with the well established premise that mutual cooperation cannot evolve
without the ability to detect and punish cheaters (Axelrod, 1984; Trivers, 1971). It goes
on to hypothesize the existence of an evolved mechanism designed specifically to detect
cheating within the context o f social exchange (the cheater detection mechanism; CDM).
Recently Yamagishi and colleagues, primarily prisoner’s dilemma researchers
interested in the development of trust as a precursor to cooperation, have drawn attention
to the fact that while cheater detection is important, it would be a useless skill if no one
was motivated to cooperate in the first place (Kiyonari, Tanida, & Yamagishi, 2000). In
other words, cheater detection is only beneficial once a person has decided to unilaterally
cooperate. Starting with that simple observation, the two experimental paradigms are
mapped onto Pruitt and Kimmel’s (1977) goal/expectation theory of cooperation.
According to this theory, before mutual cooperation can be obtained, two conditions have
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to be satisfied: 1) the goal of the interaction must be transformed from the narrow pursuit
of self-interest to one of mutual gain, and 2) the interaction partner must be expected to
forego the narrow pursuit of self-interest as well. According to Yamagishi and
colleagues, cheater detection research focuses on the second, “expectation” component of
the theory.
Kiyonari, Tanida, and Yamagishi (2000) go on to hypothesize that if humans
possess a CDM designed to protect against those who would break the “expectation” of
cooperation, then we should also possess a mechanism designed to motivate us towards
the goal of mutual cooperation. Yamagishi and colleagues call this second mechanism
the Social Exchange Heuristic (SEH). Yamagishi and colleagues have made several
untested predictions about the nature of this mechanism, many of which have potential
implications for SCT. It is the purpose of the current study to test these predictions,
seeking a potential integration of SCT and the SEH. The following sections outline, in
greater detail, the two theories and then discuss how they may be interrelated.
Cheater Detection in Social Exchange
The Wason selection task has been used since the 1960’s as a tool to understand
the nature of human logical reasoning (Wason, 1966). Karl Popper postulated that
science was based on the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning, that is, the
search for examples that contradict a given hypothesis (Popper, 1959). Wason developed
the selection task in an attempt to determine if humans use this same deductive logic in
everyday life. Thus the Wason task tests a participant’s ability to search for violations of
a hypothesis. The hypothesis in a Wason task is presented as a conditional rule of the
form I fP then Q. Participants are asked to look for potential violations of the rule by
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examining a set of four facts, represented by four cards. The cards have information on
both sides. The conditional hypothesis to be evaluated concerns the relationship between
the information on both sides of the cards. It is the participant’s task to determine which
cards need to be turned over in order to check for violations of the rule. The information
visible to participants corresponds to P, not P, Q, and not Q. If a card has information
about P on one side, then the other side will have information about Q, and vice versa.
Correctly solving the task requires participants to select the cards that represent P and not
Q-

Despite the apparent simplicity of the standard, abstract Wason task, it is very
difficult for participants to solve correctly. It is not uncommon for fewer than 20% of
participants to correctly solve standard versions of the task (Cosmides 1989; Gigerenzer
& Hug, 1992). Since its inception, a large literature has emerged dedicated to
understanding the source of the selection task’s difficulty and the ways in which
performance can be improved. For example, it has been suggested that more realistic
rules facilitate performance on the task (Wason & Shapiro, 1971). However tests of that
hypothesis have failed to find such an effect (Manktelow & Evans, 1979). It has also
been suggested that prior, real-world experience with a particular rule helps to facilitate
task performance (Cox & Griggs, 1982), which has subsequently been ruled out as a
plausible hypothesis (Cosmides, 1989). From this research, a confusing pattern began to
emerge in which certain manipulations improved performance while others had no effect.
Furthermore, no existing theory seemed to link together and effectively explain the
various performance-enhancing manipulations.
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However, in 1989, Cosmides analyzed the existing pattern of Wason results in
terms of the type of tasks the human mind was designed to solve. This evolutionary task
analysis ultimately led to the development of SCT, which currently provides the most
comprehensive and parsimonious explanation of Wason task performance. Social
contract theory is grounded in an evolutionary analysis of social cooperation and
reciprocity which argues that human sociality could not evolve without the ability to
detect and punish cheaters (Axelrod, 1984; Trivers, 1971). Based on this premise,
Cosmides hypothesized that humans possess a “look for cheaters” algorithm (the CDM)
which is activated during social exchange situations. Social exchanges can be expressed
in the Wason task by a rule with the following structure: I f you take the benefit, then you
must meet the requirements (i.e. pay the costs). Cheating on this rule involves the taking
of a benefit without paying the associated cost. Furthermore, solving a social contract
Wason task correctly, choosing the P and not Q cards, is synonymous with correctly
detecting potential instances of cheating.
According to Cosmides, many of the studies that reported improved Wason
performance in the past were unknowingly manipulating social exchange content,
subsequently activating the CDM. For example, Cheng and Holyoak (1985) constructed
a content-free Wason task that elicited high levels of performance. This abstract Wason
task contained the rule “I f one is to take action A, then one must first satisfy precondition
B. ” According to Cosmides (1989), Cheng and Holyoak’s rule, although abstract,
contains an implicit cost-benefit structure. Saying someone must satisfy a precondition is
just another way of saying that they must pay a cost or meet a requirement. Furthermore,
paying a cost to be allowed to take a particular action is a linguistic cue that the action is
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beneficial. Supporting her analysis, Cosmides constructed Wason tasks that were
identical, manipulating only the presence of social exchange content. Consistent with her
hypothesis, the social contract tasks facilitated performance to a significant degree. For
example, Cosmides created the Grover School Wason task which has the following rule:
“I f a student is to be assigned to Grover school, then that student must live in Grover
city. ” The content of each Wason task was identical expect for one crucial manipulation:
The presence of social exchange cues. In the non-social contract version, the participant
was cued into the perspective of someone monitoring board of education volunteers who
were given the task of assigning incoming students to the appropriate school. The
scenario mentions two cities and their corresponding schools: Grover City, Grover
school, Hanover City, and Hanover school. Volunteers are supposed to use the rule when
assigning students. It is the task of the participant to make sure no violations of the rule
occur. The social contract version includes two additional pieces of information. First,
participants are told that Grover school is a much better school than Hanover. Second,
each volunteer has a child enter the school system and each volunteer assigned their own
child to a school. This additional information provides a motive for volunteers to cheat
on the rule in order to ensure that their own child gets into the better of the two schools.
Again, it is the task of the participant to monitor for violations of the rule. Simply adding
the social exchange content to the Grover school task increased performance by 45
percent (30% correct in the non-social contract version versus 75% correct in the social
contract version). Subsequently, Cosmides’ original results have been replicated across
many different experiments using a variety o f Wason tasks (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992;
Gigerenzer & Hug, 1993; Fiddick & Cummins, 2001).

In summary, SCT states that humans possess an evolved mechanism specifically
designed to detect cheating in social exchange. This mechanism is activated by the
presence of a social exchange, that is, a relationship involving the reciprocal exchange of
benefits. The Wason task has been used to show that when social exchange content is
present, participants are particularly adept at solving the task correctly, that is, detecting
instances of potential cheating. However, the ability to detect cheating is not the only
prerequisite for the evolution of human cooperation. Before the ability to detect cheating
can have any significance at all, humans have to be motivated to cooperate, that is, to
enter into social exchanges. Recently, Yamagishi and colleagues have begun analyzing
this facet of the evolution of human cooperation. The resulting theoretical framework is
a marriage of Yamagishi’s earlier work on trust and the game theoretical approach to
human cooperation (Kiyonari, Tanida, & Yamagishi, 2000; Yamagishi 1998; Yamagishi
& Kikuchi, 2001).
The Social Exchange Heuristic and Trust
Trust, Gullibility, and Social Intelligence. A popular belief about highly trusting
individuals is that they are naive or gullible. Indeed, there exists empirical evidence to
support this claim. For example, Gurtman and Lion (1982) have argued that high trust is
an indicator of the indiscriminant acceptance o f information provided by others.
Similarly, Garske (1976) suggests that highly trusting individuals have a less complex
cognitive structure than less trusting individuals which is less useful for interpreting the
behavior of others. However intuitively convincing this view may be, a significant body
of research does not support this connection between trust and gullibility (Rotter, 1980).
The aforementioned conception of trust relies on defining trust as the willingness to
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accept information provided by others. If trust equals acceptance of information, then by
definition, trustful people are gullible. However, if as Rotter (1967) suggests, trust
relates to an individual’s general expectations of other people’s trustworthiness than the
connection between trust and gullibility is severed. Believing that other will generally
tend to act in a trustworthy manner is logically independent from how likely one is to
actually accept what others say. Thus, according to Rotter (1980), general trust can be
defined as default expectations regarding other people’s trustworthiness, while gullibility
is insensitivity to information suggesting untrustworthiness.
Building upon Rotter’s conceptual framework, Yamagishi and colleagues
(Yamagishi, Kikuchi, & Kosugi, 1999) argue that under certain conditions, high-trusters
are actually more vigilant than low-trusters when dealing with others. In a series of
experiments, first conducted by Kosugi and Yamagishi (1998), participants’ sensitivity to
information revealing the trustworthiness or untrustworthiness of others was analyzed.
Participants were shown short vignettes and asked whether the person depicted in them
would act in a trustworthy manner or not. When no information about the character in
the story was provided, as expected, high-trusters rated the person more likely to act in a
trustworthy manner than did low-trusters. Similarly, when content was added to the story
relating positive information about the character, the same pattern emerged. However,
when negative information was added suggesting that the person in the story had acted in
an untrustworthy manner in the past, the pattern of results reversed. That is, high-trusters
rated the person as being significantly less likely to act in a trustworthy manner than did
low-trusters. Thus, when the person depicted in the story was portrayed as being
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potentially untrustworthy, high-trusters were much more suspicion of the characters
intentions as compared to low-trusters.
Kakiuchi & Yamagishi (1997) replicated this effect in the context of the
prisoner’s dilemma (PD) paradigm. The classic PD is a type of non-zero-sum game in
which two players choose to “cooperate” or “defect”, independent of what the other
player does. The concern for both players is to maximize their payoff, without any
concern for the other player. The standard payoff matrix in a PD results in defection
being the optimal strategy, regardless of what the other player does. The iterated PD is a
variant of the classic paradigm where two players engage in repeated trials. In the
iterated PD, mutual cooperation can emerge as a result of the player’s ability to punish
their partner’s defection on subsequent trials with a defection of their own.
Kakiuchi & Yamagishi (1997) conducted an iterated PD experiment with the
added twist that in addition to choosing between cooperating and defecting, participants
could adjust the structure of the payoff matrix in response to their partner’s behavioral
decision. Participants were allowed the option to increase or decrease the size of their
own monetary payoff. However, increasing the size of their own payoff had the
additional effect of increasing their potential loss if the other player defected.
Conversely, decreasing the size of one’s own payoff lowered the potential losses accrued
if a partner defected. Thus, if trust was established between the two players, increasing
the size of one’s own payoff was the optimal decision. However, if a participant could
not trust his/her partner, reducing the size of their own payoff was the safest option.
Participants played a series of three, 16-trial blocks. The results of this experiment
supported the hypothesis that high-trusters are more sensitive to information suggesting
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the untrustworthiness of another person. In the first block of the trials, high-trusters were
much more likely to lower their own payoff when their partner defected, minimizing their
losses. Low-trusters showed the opposite pattern and tended to increase their own payoff
regardless of their partners behavior choice. It wasn’t until block two of the trials that
low-trusters began to adjust their payoff matrix in accord with their partner’s behavior
decisions. Across all three trials, high-trusters were much more responsive to their
partner’s tendency to cooperate or defect, adjusting their own payoff matrix accordingly.
As a result, as measured by the total amount of money earning in the game, high-trusters
profited significantly more than low-trusters.
The rationale for Yamagishi’s sensitivity-to-information hypothesis comes from
his earlier work on the emancipation theory of trust (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994).
According to the theory, trust and commitment formation represent alternative solutions
to the problem of uncertainty in social exchange. Social uncertainty is a serious problem
for the development of human cooperation. The potential benefits of cooperation,
enhanced personal gain, come with the potential cost of exploitation. Yamagishi and
Yamagishi (1994) define social uncertainty as existing for an actor when 1) their
exchange partner has incentives to act in a way that imposes costs on the actor (i.e. cheat
them), and 2) the actor does not have the requisite information to accurately predict
his/her partner’s behavior.
Kollock’s (as cited in Yamagishi, Kikuchi, & Kosugi, 1999) analysis of the rice
and rubber trades in Southeast Asia is a perfect illustration of the differences between
trust and commitment relationships. The quality of rice is readily apparent, and as such,
the buyer has little worry of being cheated by the seller. In contrast, it is impossible to
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determine the quality of raw rubber until it has been processed. As a result, the buyers of
raw rubber are at a significant risk of being cheated by unknowingly purchasing a low
quality product. According to Kollock, the difference in social uncertainty in the trades
of rice and raw rubber explain the dominant forms of trade for each good. Rice is traded
in open markets among relative strangers, while the trade of raw rubber typically occurs
in the context of long-term exchange relationships.
The rice trade is what Yamagishi (1998) would call a trust relationship, while raw
rubber is traded by the formation of commitment relationships. Yamagishi suggests that
Kollock’s analysis, while instructive, is incomplete. Although he is in agreement with
Kollock regarding commitment relationships as a solution to the problem of social
uncertainty (Yamagishi, Cooke, & Watabe, 1998), Yamagishi draws attention to the
influence of opportunity costs on social relationships and trust (Yamagishi, Kikuchi, &
Kosugi, 1999). Commitment relationships trade opportunities to interact with alternate
exchange partners for security (i.e. a long-term relationship). This is an effective means
of solving the problem of social uncertainty only if the costs of missed exchange
opportunities are less than the stability gains associated with commitment (i.e. reducing
the likelihood of being cheated by your exchange partner). However, when opportunity
costs are high - when the number of potential quality exchange partners is high commitment relationships are a liability. The central tenet of the emancipation theory of
trust is that high degrees of generalized trust act as a springboard, allowing individuals to
break out of the constraints of a commitment relationship when higher quality exchange
partners are present. Thus, trust acts to “emancipate” people from the stability of
commitment relations despite the presence of social uncertainty.

12
However, deserting commitment relationships under conditions of social
uncertainty is not without its costs. With each new exchange partner comes the potential
for being exploited. Yamagishi (1998) argues that it is this combination of high social
uncertainty and opportunity costs that explains high-truster’s sensitivity to trust-relevant
information. In a social environment with a large number of exchange opportunities,
trust, as conceptualized by Yamagishi, may prove advantageous for two reasons. First,
having a high degree of generalized trust towards others would facilitate interaction
between strangers. Second, it would help guard against the perils of a socially uncertain
environment through increased informational sensitivity. By way o f example, Yamagishi
& Yamagishi (1994) compared the social structure of American and Japanese societies.
They argue that Japanese society is largely organized around highly structured
commitment relationships (i.e. the business practice of life-long employment), virtually"
eliminating social uncertainty and opportunity costs. In contrast, American society is
much more “open”, and subsequently is characterized by a relatively large amount of
social uncertainty and opportunity cost. Applying the emancipation theory o f trust to
American and Japanese society leads to a rather counter-intuitive prediction. That is,
Americans should report average levels of generalized trust that are higher than the
Japanese. Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) found support for this hypothesis by
surveying a large number of American and Japanese college students. Their results are
corroborated by a large-scale study conducted by The Institute of Statistical Mathematics
over a decade earlier (Hayashi, Suzuki, Suzuki, & Murakami, 1982).
If generalized trust towards others is adaptive, that is, it helps to facilitate
interaction between strangers as well as guards against potential exploitation, then how

does it develop? Yamagishi, Kikuchi, and Kosugi (1999) propose that social intelligence
is responsible for calibrating both levels of trust and sensitivity to potential exploitation.
Their argument is as follows: Those that grow up in a socially uncertain environment,
with a high degree of opportunity costs devote more cognitive resources to the
development of skills for discerning the trustworthiness of others. This view assumes
generalized trust to be a byproduct of social intelligence. That is, having highly
developed social intelligence allows trust to develop because of an increased ability to
detect and interpret the behavior of others - particularly those cues that suggest
untrustworthiness. However, in a stable social environment, such as traditional Japanese
society, social intelligence is less likely to develop. The security offered by such an
environment precludes the need for high levels of trust or vigilance.
The Social Exchange Heuristic. Recently, Kiyonari, Tanida, and Yamagishi
(2000) have attempted to reformulate Yamagishi’s earlier work on trust and social
intelligence into a pseudo-evolutionary theory of human cooperation. They begin by
accepting Cosmides and Tooby’s (1992) argument that social exchange has played a
central role in human evolutionary history and that the achievement of mutual
cooperation was one of the most crucial adaptive tasks faced by our ancestors. Social
contract theory focuses on only one aspect of this adaptive problem - the detection of
cheaters. However, if individuals are not willing to enter into mutually cooperative
relationships in the first place, the ability to detect cheating is inconsequential. Building
upon the framework of Pruitt and Kimmels’s (1977) goal/expectation theory of
cooperation, Kiyonari, Tanida, & Yamagishi (2000) posit that the achievement of mutual
cooperation requires that 1) individuals be motivated to work towards the goal of
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reciprocal exchange, and 2) they expect interaction partners to adopt a similar goal.
Social contract theory’s focus is on the expectation components of the model - detecting
cheating only makes sense if you expect a potential interaction partner to cooperate. The
theoretical framework that Yamagishi and colleagues developed to explain the goal
component of human cooperation is called the SEH.
The SEH, similar to the CDM, is hypothesized to be a cognitive mechanism that
evolved for the specific purpose of facilitating human cooperation. The SEH is activated
when cues to social exchange are present, and once activated leads individuals to
transform an exchange opportunity from a situation in which the goal is the pursuit of
strict self-interest to that of mutual cooperation. Research using the standard prisoner’s
dilemma paradigm illustrates the activation of the SEH. Recall that in the standard
prisoner’s dilemma the behavioral decision of non-cooperation or defection is the rational
choice. However, experimental studies repeatedly show that participants do not act
rationally, and in fact, tend to cooperate at much higher levels than logic would suggest.
In fact, when asked, participants tend to prefer the outcome of mutual cooperation despite
lower personal gains (Kollock, 1994). Yamagishi and colleagues argue that prisoner’s
dilemma games are social exchanges and activate the SEH. As such, participants
transform the optimal outcome of the game from one in which their own gains are
maximized, to one in which mutual cooperation is preferred. A series of prisoner’s
dilemma experiments were conducted in order to illustrate the operation of the SEH as
well as rule out alternative hypotheses (see Kiyonari, Tanida, & Yamagishi, 2000). The
overall message of these experiments was that the majority of participants played the
standard prisoner’s dilemma game “irrationally” - they behaved as if the optimal payoffs
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were obtained when mutual cooperation was achieved (when both players cooperated).
In short, perceiving the game as a social exchanged caused participants to adopt the goal
of mutual cooperation, instead of the pursuit of strict self-interest.
Trust and the Social Exchange Heuristic. Recall that Yamagishi’s emancipation
theory of trust argues that high levels of generalized trust motivate people to seek out
new exchange partners when opportunity costs are high. This high level of trust is also
associated with increased informational sensitivity that leads to higher levels of suspicion
regarding potentially untrustworthy interaction partners. Similarly, in the context of the
prisoner’s dilemma, activation of the SEH results in adopting the goal of mutual
cooperation. Yamagishi and colleagues have hypothesized that individuals with high
levels of generalized trust have a stronger or “more activated” SEH. This makes sense if
the purpose of generalized trust is to facilitate social exchange between strangers under
conditions of social uncertainty. Furthermore, if the detection of cheaters within social
exchange is just as important as adopting the goal of mutual cooperation, the two
mechanisms should be intimately linked. A central, untested research issue that emerges
from this potential link is the rather counter-intuitive hypothesis that individuals with a
strong SEH (i.e. high-trusters) are particularly good at detecting cheaters within the
context of social exchange.
Trust and Cheater Detection
It is this link between trust and cheater detection that the current study is meant to
explore. Yamagishi’s theorizing about trust’s role in social exchange has clear
implications for SCT. The most obvious similarity between Yamagishi’s SEH and the
CDM is that they are both hypothesized to be activated within the context of a social
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exchange relationship. If that is indeed true, then both mechanisms should be activated in
tandem. This proposition makes sense not only from a logical perspective, but
theoretically as well. Yamagishi (Kiyonari, Tanida, & Yamagishi, 2000) and Cosmides
(Cosmides and Tooby, 1992) have argued that both the desire for reciprocal exchange
and the ability to detect cheaters are crucial for the evolution of human cooperation.
However, much of the focus has been on the ability to detect cheaters and SCT has
remained relatively unchanged since its introduction nearly 20 years ago. Given that the
SEH and the CDM operate within the same domain of human cooperation and are
hypothesized to be activated by the same social cues, it is the primary purpose of the
current study to explore trust’s role in the ability of humans to detect cheating within the
context of social exchanges.
If activation of the SEH results in increased informational sensitivity when
engaged in social exchange, then it is plausible that such increased suspicion or vigilance
would translate into enhanced cheater detection. However, outside of exchange
relationships, there is no theoretical reason to expect such a relationship between trust
and cheater detection since neither the SEH nor the CDM would be active. Study 1 is
designed to answer this important preliminary question: does trust moderate the
relationship between social exchange and cheater detection? That is, do high trusters,
with a potentially stronger SEH, excel at detecting cheating within the context of a social
exchange?
Hypothesis 1: High-trusters will be more likely to correctly solve social
contract Wason tasks than low trusters. However, this effect will
disappear when social exchange content is removed.
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If trust does influence the ability to detect cheaters then several additional
questions emerge. First, is it that generalized trust directly influences the CDM, or is the
relationship mediated by the sensitivity-to-information effect? Yamagishi would argue
that trust increases sensitivity to information, which would raise the level of suspicion or
vigilance an individual might have towards others. This increased suspicion may result
in a stronger CDM response. Study 2 proposes and tests a mediational model that is
consistent with the above hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: High-trusters will have significantly more suspicion
towards others when information suggesting the untrustworthiness of
others is present, which will result in enhanced cheater detection.
An additional research question that can be derived from an integration of the
SEH and SCT is whether or not Yamagishi’s prediction that socio-cultural context (i.e.
the degree of social uncertainty and opportunity cost) calibrates generalized levels of
trust, in turn moderates the ability to detect cheaters. Specifically, Yamagishi argues that
a high degree of generalized trust is beneficial in an environment characterized by social
uncertainty and high opportunity costs. When social uncertainty and opportunity cost are
low, a high degree of generalized trust becomes less beneficial. Based on this analysis,
Study 3 seeks to determine if socio-cultural context moderates the relationship between
trust and cheater detection.
Hypothesis 3: High-trusters will outperform low-trusters on Wason tasks
scenarios that are characterized by high social uncertainty and opportunity
costs. However, the trust effect will disappear when social uncertainty
and opportunity costs are low.
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Study 3 also tests Yamagishi’s prediction that social intelligence is the primary
factor responsible for the development of generalized trust. Yamagishi’s analysis of
social intelligence is from a cognitive-developmental perspective. That is, when
individuals are faced with a complex social environment (i.e. high social uncertainty and
opportunity cost) the acquisition of social intelligence results in enhanced cognitive
functioning in regards to picking up on cues of untrustworthiness. This increased
vigilance allows for the development of trust relationships since high-trusters are better
protected from the costs of exploitation. If social intelligence is responsible for this
enhanced sensitivity to information, it is plausible that it is also at the root of cheater
detection. Study 3 provides a test of a model that is consistent with the above analysis.
Hypothesis 4: The relationship between social intelligence and cheater
detection is mediated by generalized trust.
Study 1
Study 1 was designed to test the prediction that high-trusters are better able to
detect cheaters than low-trusters within the context of a social exchange. If high levels of
generalized trust are associated with increased sensitivity to trust-relevant information
about others (Yamagishi, Kikuchi & Kosugi, 1999), then it is plausible to hypothesize
that this increased apprehension translates into more accurate cheater detection.
However, in line with SCT, the CDM should only be activated within the context of a
social exchange (Cosmides, 1989).
To test this prediction, a Wason task was used to measure participant’s ability to
detect cheaters. Two versions of the Wason task were created. In one version of the task
participants were cued into a situation involving a social contract, while the second

version of the task lacked a social-contract component. Roughly half o f the participants
received the social contract task, while the remainder solved the non-social contract task.
Participants were also given a trust scale designed to measure generalized levels of trust
towards others. It was hypothesized that generalized trust would moderate the
relationship between social exchange and cheater detection. Specifically, levels of trust
should affect Wason task performance only for those participants who are in the social
contract condition. In addition, according to Yamagishi’s predictions, higher levels of
trust should be associated with increased Wason task performance.
A secondary, more exploratory analysis was also conducted in Study 1. By
limiting the analysis to only those participants who solved the Wason task mcorrectly, it
is possible to determine if there is a relationship between generalized trust and the
identification of instances of potential cheating. In other words, who is more likely to see
potential instances of cheating, regardless of accuracy, high-trusters or low-trusters? The
total number of cards selected by each participant was used as a measure of how
suspicious they were o f the potential for cheating. In a typical Wason task, the number o f
chosen cards corresponds to the number of perceived or potential instances of cheating.
No a priori predictions were made for this secondary analysis. It is plausible to
hypothesize that either high or low-trusters would be more suspicious of the potential to
cheat given the right circumstances. Intuitively, it makes sense that low trusters would be
more cautious, and thus assume higher levels of potential cheating. However, Yamagishi
and colleagues have shown that high-trusters may be more sensitive to trust-relevant
information than low-trusters (Kikuchi, Watanabe & Yamagishi, 1997; Kosugi &
Yamagishi, 1998), making the reverse hypothesis tenable: High trusters, when faced with
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an uncertain situation, will be more vigilant and select more cards than there less trusting
counterparts.
Method
Participants
Two-hundred and three undergraduates (110 females, 93 males) enrolled in an
introductory psychology course at The College of William and Mary participated in the
experiment. Students did not receive compensation for their participation. However,
participation was entirely voluntary and anonymous.
Material
Trust scale. Yamagishi’s trust scale is designed to measure the general degree of
trust respondents feel for others (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1989; Yamagishi &
Yamagishi, 1994). It is an 11-item, self-report questionnaire that asks respondents to
rate, on a seven-point likert scale, the extent to which they agree or disagree with 11
trust-related statements (1 = strongly agree, 7 = strongly disagree). Such statements
include, “most people are basically honest” and “in today’s society, if you are not careful,
people will use you” (reverse scored). Yamagishi has validated his trust scale across
several studies (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1989) and established convergent validity with
the more commonly used trust scale developed by Rotter (Yamagishi & Yamagishi,
1994).
Was on task. The Wason task used in Study 1 was a modified version of
Cosmides’ (1989) Grover School scenario. The Grover school scenario includes a social
contract condition and a non-social contract condition. All participants received either
the social contract or non-social contract version of the Grover school task. Both
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versions use the rule “i f a student is to be assigned to Grover High School, then that
student must live in Grover City. ” The card choices, along with the correct answer,
remain constant across both conditions. From left to right, the card choices read: Grover
High School (p card), Town o f Hanover (not-q card), Hanover High School (not-p card),
and Grover City (q card). Solving the task requires selecting both the p and not-q cards.
In the social contract version, the background story describes Grover High as
being a superior school to Hanover High. Participants are cued into the perspective of
someone assigned to monitor the individuals whose job it is to allocate students to
particular high schools based on the rule. Furthermore, these individuals each have
children entering high school and just happen to be responsible for their assignment.
Thus a motive exists for cheating on the above rule by placing ones own child in the
better of the two schools, regardless of what city they live in. The non-social contract
version has the same structure of the social contract rule except that the motive to cheat is
removed by omitting any information regarding the differences between the two schools.
However, the scenario is given a sense of importance of urgency by stating that
population statistics are used to allocate the appropriate number of teachers to each
school. Violations of the rule could lead to some schools getting too few teachers.
Procedure
Study 1 was conducted in an introductory psychology course, at the beginning of
a regularly scheduled class period. With the consent of the instructor, materials were
handed out to participants as they entered the classroom and were told to keep them face
down until instructed to turn them over. Students were informed that their participation
in the study was completely voluntary and in no way would their identities be known to

22
the experimenter. After a brief set o f verbal instructions they were given ten minutes to
complete the experimental packet. Participants were debriefed at the end of the semester
through a mass email.
Design
Binary logistic regression was used to predict the probability of a participant
correctly solving the Wason task. Binary logistic regression is the appropriate analysis
when, 1) the criterion variable is dichotomous, and 2) some predictor variables are
continuous, while others are categorical (Thrash, 2007). The predictor variables in the
analysis were the Wason task version (Social contract versus Non-Social contract), the
participant’s aggregated trust scale score, and a trust by Wason version interaction term.
Linear regression was used to determine if there was a relationship between the
total number of cards a participant selected and his/her aggregated trust score. The
criterion variable was the total number of cards selected and the predictors in the equation
were Wason version, generalized trust scores, and the interaction between Wason version
and trust.
Results
Manipulation Check
A chi-squared analysis was used to test the null hypothesis that there was no
difference in Wason task performance between the social contract and non-social contract
conditions. The results indicated a rejection of the null hypothesis, with the social
contract group significantly outperforming the non-social contract group, % = 20.08 (1, N
= 203), jd < .001. Specifically, 49.5% (50/101) of participants correctly solved the social
contract Wason task, compared to only 19.6% (20/102) in the non-social contract
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condition. Overall, participants who were given the social contract Wason task were four
times more likely to solve it correctly compared to those in the non-social contract
condition. Although the percentage of participants solving the social contract Wason task
correctly is somewhat lower then typically reported, the overall size and direction of the
effect is highly consistent with previous research (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Gigerenzer
& Hug, 1992).
Trust Moderating Social Exchange and Cheater Detection
Binary logistic regression was used to test the hypothesis that generalized trust
moderates the relationship between social exchange and cheater detection (see Figure 1
for a diagram of the model). Wason task performance (correct, incorrect) was regressed
on the Wason task version variable (social contract, non-social contract), participants’
generalized trust scores, and the trust by Wason version interaction. Wason version was
found to significantly predict Wason performance, P = .722, p < .001. When controlling
for the other variables in the model, participants in the social contract condition were 2.06
times more likely to solve the Wason task correctly when compared to those in the non
social contract condition. Participant trust scores failed to significantly predict Wason
performance, p = .090,/? > .05. Finally, the trust by Wason version interaction was a
significant predictor of Wason performance, p = .404,/? < .05 (see Table 1 for mean trust
scores by condition). As depicted in Figure 2, trust scores were a significant predictor of
Wason performance only in the social contract condition, p = .495,/? < .05. The odds
ratio for the relationship between trust scores and Wason performance within the social
contract condition was 1.64, meaning that every point o f increase in a participant’s trust
scores was associated with them being just over one and a half times more likely to solve
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the Wason task correctly. As predicted, trust scores had no effect on Wason performance
in the non-social contract condition, p = -.312,/? > .05.
Trust and Suspicion
The total number o f card selections made among those participants who solved
the Wason task incorrectly was regressed on the Wason task version variable,
participants’ generalized trust scores, and the trust by Wason version interaction. None
of the variables were found to significantly predict the number of cards selected. Thus, in
the context of the Wason task paradigm, generalized trust scores do not seem to be
predictive of the level of suspicion participants have regarding the potential for cheating,
as measured by the number of cards selected.
Discussion
The above results support hypothesis 1, that generalized trust moderates the
relationship between social exchange and cheater detection. High-trusters were
significantly better at solving the Wason task than low-trusts when social exchange
content was present. This outcome supports Yamagishi’s suggestion that trusting
individuals may be better at detecting cheaters than their less trusting counterparts
(Kiyonari, Tanida, & Yamagishi, 2000). High-trusters are not only more sensitive to
trust-relevant information, but appear to translate this vigilance into more accurate
cheater detection. The finding that trust influences the activation of the CDM is a
significant addition to SCT. Since its introduction, the proponents of SCT have argued
that social exchange was the key to understanding the activation of the CDM. While
study 1 supports this assertion, it goes beyond this aspect of SCT, suggesting that the
CDM itself is calibrated by a personality variable (generalized trust) which Yamagishi
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hypothesizes to be a component o f a larger cognitive system for the regulation of social
exchange. This larger social exchange mechanism is made up of the SEH and the CDM.
Both systems are essential, and represent adaptive solutions for the two primary obstacles
on the road to the evolution of human cooperation: 1) having the motivation to adopt the
goal of mutual cooperation, and 2) being able to detect and punish those who break the
agreed upon contract of a social exchange.
Establishing a link between generalized trust and cheater detection, while
consistent with both SEH and SCT, leaves several important questions unanswered.
First, is it that generalized trust affects cheater detection independent of Yamagishi’s
sensitivity-to-information effect, or does this sensitivity-to-information mediate the
relationship between trust and the CDM? That is, does generalized trust lead to increased
levels of suspicion, which subsequently enhance cheater detection ability, or is
generalized trust simply a common cause of suspicion and enhanced cheater detection?
Second, Yamagishi conceives of trust as being calibrated by socio-cultural context,
through the development of social intelligence. Does trust and its effect on cheater
detection change based on socio-cultural context as Yamagishi predicts? And finally, is
social intelligence ultimately responsible for the calibration of trust and the CDM? Study
2 is designed to test the first question, while Study 3 addresses other two.
Study 2
Yamagishi has provided support for the hypothesis that high-trusters are more
sensitive than low-trusters to information suggesting the untrustworthiness of an
individual (Yamagishi, Kikuchi & Kosugi, 1999). However, this effect only occurs when
negative information regarding the character of another person is presented. When
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positive or neutral information is presented about a target individual, the pattern reverses
to a more intuitive outcome: low-trusters rate individuals as being more untrustworthy.
Yamagishi explains this interaction between generalized trust and information type as a
result of the SEH. That is, individuals with a stronger SEH (those exhibiting higher
levels of trust) are more motivated to cooperate. In addition to adopting the goal of
mutual cooperation, individuals with strong SEH’s expect interaction partners to
cooperate as well. According to Yamagishi, the expectation that others will cooperate
results in an increased sensitivity to cues that point towards an individuals
untrustworthiness, resulting in increased levels of suspicion and vigilance when such
dues are present. Yamagishi does not hypothesize a specific mechanism by which this
informational sensitivity operates, nor does he provide evidence that this increased
suspicion actually translates into an enhanced ability to detect instances of cheating. In
light of these unanswered questions, Study 2 has two goals: 1) to provide a replication of
Yamagishi’s hypothesized interaction between trust and information type, and 2) to test
the hypothesis that suspicion scores mediate the relationship between generalized trust
and cheater detection.
To provide a replication of Yamagishi’s sensitivity effect, participants were given
trust scenarios (modeled off of Yamagishi’s original materials) and Yamagishi’s
generalized trust scale. Three versions of the trust scenarios were created where
information type was manipulated: Participants were assigned to a positive, negative or
neutral information condition. They were asked to rate the probability of the person in
the story acting in a trustworthy manner. A replication of Yamagishi’s findings will
result if there is a significant information condition by generalized trust score interaction.
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That is, high-trusters should only have significantly lower scenario scores (more
suspicion that the person in the story will act in an untrustworthy manner) than lowtrusters in the negative information condition.
To test the hypothesis that Yamagishi’s sensitivity to information effect ultimately
mediates the relationship between generalized trust and cheater detection, participants in
Study 2 were also asked to solve a social contract Wason task. A moderated-mediational
model is posited, with trust scenario scores (suspicion scores) mediating the relationship
between the trust by information condition interaction and cheater detection as measured
by Wason task performance. Specifically, high levels of generalized trust, and its
associated informational sensitivity, activate the SEH more readily, which causes
individuals to simultaneously adopt the goal of mutual cooperation and expectation of
cooperation by others. As a consequence, the CDM is activated, increasing suspicion and
the resulting ability to better detect instances of cheating. However, this effect should be
strongest in the negative information condition, where high-trusters have been shown to
be particularly vigilant.
Method
Participants
One-hundred and eleven (65 females, 46 males) participants were recruited from
an introductory psychology course at The College of Williams and Mary. Again, no
compensation was awarded and participation was voluntary and anonymous.
Materials
Trust Scale. The version of Yamagishi’s Generalized Trust Scale used in Study 2
was identical to the one used in Study 1.
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Wason Task: The Grover School Wason task described in the Method section of
Study 1 was used. However, only the social contract version of the task was used.
Trust Scenarios. Each participant received three short vignettes and was asked to
estimate the probability that the person depicted in the story would act in a trustworthy
manner. Participants were assigned to one of three conditions: the neutral information
condition, the positive information condition, or the negative information condition. The
neutral condition served as a baseline measure and consisted of a description of the
situation with which the character in the story was confronted. In the positive and
negative conditions, additional information about the person in the story was provided.
The positive condition included information suggesting that the character in the story has
acted trustworthy in the past, while the negative condition presents evidence calling the
trustworthiness of the central character into question. For each of the three vignettes
participants rated the probability (0-100%) that the person in the story would act in a
trustworthy manner. Participant scores were calculated by summing their responses
across the three stories. Higher scores indicate higher attributions o f trustworthiness.
Procedure
Study 2 employed the exact same procedure as Study 1 except that it was
conducted in an alternate introductory psychology class.
Design
To replicate Yamagishi’s results, linear regression was used to predict suspicion
scores from generalized trust scores, information type, and the crucial trust by
information type interaction. Since there were three conditions within the information
type variable, a set of orthogonal contrasts was created. The first contrast compares the
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negative information condition to the remaining two conditions, and the second contrast
compares the positive and neutral information condition with each other. A hierarchical
regression was conducted, in which the first step included generalized trust and the two
aforementioned contrasts. In step two of the analysis, two interaction terms were entered
into the equation, each representing the interaction between generalized trust and one of
the contrast variables.
Logistic regression was employed to test the moderated-mediational model
predicting cheater detection from suspicion scores and the generalized trust by
information condition interaction. The model was tested by carrying out four smaller
analyses that tested for the hypothesized mediation within each information type
condition, as well as an overall effect, averaging across information condition.
PRODCLIN was used to test for a significant indirect mediation for each o f the four
proposed models.
Results
Replication o f Yamagishi
A pair of orthogonal contrasts was created from the information condition
variable to test Yamagishi’s hypothesis that the relationship between generalized trust
and levels of suspicion is moderated by information type (see Figure 3 for a diagram of
the model). The first contrast compares the negative information condition to the other
two conditions, whereas the second compared the positive information condition with the
neutral condition. A two-step hierarchical regression was used to determine'if
generalized trust interacted with the information condition contrasts. In step one of the
analysis, suspicion scores were regressed on generalized trust and the two information
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condition contrasts. The overall model tested in step one was significant (F = 7.508,/? <
.001), R2 = .174. Step two of the analysis added the two crucial trust by contrast
'y

interactions. As measured by the change in R , model 2, with the interaction terms
included, was a better predictor of suspicion scores than step one of the analysis, R =
.655 (F = 23.41,/? < .001). Table 2 provides a list of all the beta values for both steps of
the analysis. Importantly, both contrasts significantly interacted with generalized trust to
predict suspicion scores. As Figure 4 shows, low-trusters are more suspicious of others
than high-trusters in the neutral and positive information conditions. However, as
Yamagishi predicts, the pattern reverses in the negative information condition, with hightrusters becoming more vigilant (see Table 3 for mean suspicion scores by condition).
These results provide a convincing replication of Yamagishi’s sensitivity-to-information
effect despite using an abridged version of his original materials.
Connecting Informational Sensitivity to Cheater Detection
The second analysis in Study 2 tested a model in which information type
moderated the role of suspicion scores as a mediator between generalized trust and
cheater detection (see Figure 5 for a diagram of the model). Path A of the model
corresponds to the interactive effects of generalized trust and information type on
suspicion scores, while path B represents how well Wason performance can be predicted
from suspicion scores when controlling for generalized trust. Beta weights were
calculated for each path and PRODCLIN was used to test for indirect mediated effects.
The analysis was broken up into four parts: the overall effect when averaging across
information type, and one analysis for each information condition. Table 4 shows the
path coefficients for each of the four models. No evidence of indirect mediation was
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found in any of the tested models. As expected, generalized trust was a significant
predictor of suspicion scores in each of the four analyses.
Discussion
One plausible causal model that results from combining the predictions of the
SEH and SCT is that trust interacts with information type to predict levels of suspicion
(informational sensitivity), which in turn predict the accuracy of cheater detection.
Although the design of Study 2 is not sufficient to decisively confirm or rule out such a
causal model, the specific pattern of results are not consistent with the proposed
hypothesis. That is, the relationship between the generalized trust/information type
interaction and cheater detection was not found to be mediated by suspicion scores.
Although Yamagishi’s sensitivity to information effect was replicated in study 2, it failed
to predict Wason performance about and beyond generalized trust alone. A participant’s
level of suspicion was not related to Wason performance regardless of the type of
information they were given. The results of Study 2 are more consistent with an
alternative explanation: that generalized trust separately influences suspicion and cheater
detection and there is no causal path leading from generalized trust, to suspicion scores,
and finally to cheater detection. In other words, it does not seem to be the case that levels
of suspicion, as measures by Yamagishi’s trust scenarios have anything to do with the
activation of the CDM.
One potential reason for the dissociation between suspicion and cheater detection
is the nature of Yamagishi’s trust scenarios. They essentially ask participants to rate how
suspicious they are of the trustworthiness of a character in a story. The person depicted
in the story is not a potential exchange partner and a very limited amount of information
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is provided. Perhaps if the measure of suspicion were obtained in such a way as to make
the “other’s” degree of trustworthiness more personally salient to participants, a
connection between trust, suspicion, and cheater detection would be found.
Study 3
Yamagishi has shown that levels of generalized trust are calibrated in an adaptive
way towards an individual’s specific socio-cultural environment (Yamagishi, Kikuchi, &
Kosugi, 1999). High-trusters exhibit increased sensitivity to trust-relevant information as
a result of an environment with high levels of social uncertainty and opportunity cost.
Such a dynamic and unpredictable environment requires high levels of trust to facilitate
cooperative interaction, and also a high degree of vigilance against exploitation. On the
other hand, low-trust is better suited to an environment characterized by low levels of
social uncertainty and opportunity cost. The stability of such an environment precludes
the need for high levels of trust and vigilance.
To test if the above relationship holds when high and low trusters are actually
asked to detect instances of cheating, a social contract Wason task was administered to
participants. In one condition the Wason task describes a situation in which there is a
high degree of social uncertainty and opportunity cost (HC version). The scenario in the
second version is characterized by low levels of social uncertainty and opportunity cost
(LC version). If high levels of trust and its resulting sensitivity to information are
particularly beneficial when opportunity cost and social uncertainty are high, then hightrusters should outperform low-trusters on the HC Wason task. Trust should not affect
performance on the LC version of the task since the increased vigilance associated with
high levels of trust is not as advantageous within such a predictable context.
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A second purpose of Study 3 is to test Yamagishi’s suggestion that trust may be
calibrated through repeated interaction within a given socio-cultural context (i.e. HC
versus LC). One mechanism by which trust may develop is through the acquisition of
social intelligence (Yamagishi, 1998). Social intelligence affects an individual’s ability
to accurately read a social situation and act accordingly. Yamagishi has argued that HC
environments, characterized by a high degree o f uncertain interactions with others, results
in the development of higher levels of social intelligence. Conversely, individuals in LC
environments have fewer opportunities to develop social intelligence since interactions
are fewer and much more predictable. To test the relationship between trust and social
intelligence, participants were given the Tromso Social Intelligence Scale. It is
hypothesized that generalized trust scores will mediate the relationship between social
intelligence and Wason performance. The preceding hypothesis tests a model consistent
with Yamagishi’s suggestion that social intelligence drives generalized trust levels, which
in turn calibrate the CDM.
Method
Participants
One-hundred and two undergraduates were recruited from the Psychology
department subject pool, which is made up of students enrolled in introductory
psychology courses at the College of William and Mary. Students were awarded course
credit for their participation in the study. Participants signed up for the study voluntarily
and their identities remained anonymous.
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Materials
The experimental packet handed out to participants in Study 3 contained a consent
form, Yamagishi’s Generalized Trust Scale, the Tromso Social Intelligence scale, and a
Wason task.
Trust Scale. The version of Yamagishi’s Generalized Trust Scale used in Study 3,
was identical to the one used in Studies 1 and 2.
Social Intelligence Scale. The English version of the Tromso Social Intelligence
Scale (TSIS) was used. The TSIS is a 21-item self-report measure designed to assess
abilities related to the social intelligence construct. Participants rate, on a 7-point likert
scale, the degree to which a given statement describes them (1 = describes me poorly, 7 =
describes me extremely well). Such statements include, “I can predict other people’s
behavior” and “I know how my actions will make others feel.” The TSIS has been
shown to have good internal reliability and be reasonably free of response bias (Silvera,
Martinussen, & Dahl, 2001).
Wason Task. The novel Wason tasks created for Study 3 were adapted from
Kollock’s (1994) analysis of the rubber trade in Southeast Asia. The rubber scenario had
two conditions, a low opportunity cost, low social uncertainty condition (LC), and a high
opportunity cost, high social uncertainty condition (HC). Both versions of the rubber
scenario were social contracts. All participants received either the LC or HC scenario.
The two versions of the task shared the following rule: “i f rubber is to be sold fo r a high
price, then it must be o f a high quality. ” The card choices, along with the correct answer,
remain constant across both conditions. From left to right, the card choices read: High
Price (p card), Low Price {not-q card), High Quality {not-p card), and Low Quality (q
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card). As with the previous versions of Wason tasks used, solving the task requires
selecting both the p and not-q cards.
Both versions of the Rubber scenario share a background story that cue the
participant into the perspective of a member of a small Indonesian community that
specializes in the processing of raw rubber. The participant holds the important job of
traveling to a nearby market to purchase raw rubber for the community. The purchasing
of raw rubber is a difficult task because it is nearly impossible to determine the quality of
raw rubber until after it is processed. Low quality raw rubber would result in low quality
finished products, jeopardizing the community’s primary source o f income. In the LC
version, the community has a long standing relationship with one of the only nearby raw
rubber merchant (low opportunity cost); his prices tend been fair, and his raw rubber has
been of a consistently high quality (low social uncertainty). However, in the HC version,
there are many raw rubber merchants to choose from (high opportunity cost), and it is a
well know fact that these merchants tend to lie about the quality of their rubber (high
social uncertainty).
Procedure
As partial satisfaction o f a course requirement, undergraduates enrolled in
introductory psychology classes signed up for Study 3 through the Psychology
department’s online research participation system. Three experimental sessions were
held over the course of one week in a medium sized classroom. Upon arrival,
participants were handed out the experimental packet and allowed as much time as they
needed to finish. Generally, the experiment took 10-15 minutes to complete. When
finished, participants were given a short debriefing form and allowed to leave.
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Design
Binary logistic regression was used to determine if there was a relationship
between socio-cultural context and trust when detecting instances of cheating. The
criterion variable was Wason task performance, and the predictors in the equation were
Wason version (LC, HC), generalized trust scores, and a Wason version by trust score
interaction term.
As an initial test of Yamagishi’s hypothesis that social intelligence calibrates
levels of trust based on socio-cultural context, a model was tested in which generalized
trust scores were hypothesized to mediate the relationship between social intelligence and
Wason task performance. The criterion variable was Wason performance, and the
predictors in the model were participant generalized trust and social intelligence scores.
Results
Manipulation Check
Since both versions of the Wason task used in Study 3 described social contracts,
there should be no performance differences across the two conditions. A chi-squared
analysis revealed no difference in correct answers between the HC and LC conditions, %
= .538 (1, N = 102),p > .05. Participants in the LC condition solved the task correctly
58% (29/50) of the time, while the HC version of the task was solved correctly in 52%
(27/52) of the cases.
Socio-cultural Context Moderates Trust and Cheater Detection
Binary logistic regression was used to test the hypothesis that socio-cultural
context moderates the relationship between trust and cheater detection (see Figure 6 for a
diagram of the model). Wason performance was regressed on the Wason task variable
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(HC, LC), generalized trust scores, and a Wason version by trust score interaction term
(see Table 5 for mean trust scores by condition). Consistent with the manipulation check,
Wason version was not found to be a significant predictor of Wason performance, p =
.004,p > .05. However, generalized trust scores significantly predicted Wason task
performance, p = .702, p < .05. Every point of increase in a participant’s generalized
trust score was associated with them being 2.02 times more likely to correctly solve the
Wason task, regardless of the version with which they were presented. Finally, as
hypothesized, the interaction between Wason version and generalized trust was found to
significantly predict Wason performance, P = .937, p < .01. As shown in Figure 7, trust
failed to predict Wason performance on LC version of the task, p = -.249,/? > .05.
However, among those given the HC version of the task, trust significantly predicted
Wason performance, p = 1.616, p < .01. Specifically, for every one point increase in
participants trust scores, they were 5.03 times more likely to solve the HC Wason task
correctly.
Social Intelligence as a Developmental Precursor o f Trust
PRODCLIN was used to test the significance o f the model where generalized trust
mediates the relationship between social intelligence and cheater detection (see Figure 8
for a diagram of the model). Path A denotes the relationship between social intelligence
and trust, while path B represents the relationship between trust and Wason performance
when controlling for social intelligence. Path A, regressing trust scores on the social
intelligence variable, failed to produce a significant effect, p = .177,/? > .05. Path B of
the model was consistent with the previous analyses. That is, when controlling for social
intelligence, generalized trust was found to significantly predict Wason performance, p =
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.461 ,p < .05. Participants were 1.6 times more likely to. solve the Wason task correctly
for every point of increase in their trust scores. The mean trust score for those who
solved the Wason task correctly was 47.9 (SD = 7.24), and 44.5 (SD =7.62) for those
who solved the task incorrectly. Using PRODCLIN, the product of the coefficients for
paths A and B failed to reach statistical significance at an alpha level of .05. These
results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that generalized trust mediates the
relationship between social intelligence and cheater detection.
Discussion
The results of Study 3 are consistent with the hypothesis that socio-cultural
context moderates the previously established relationship between generalized trust and
cheater detection. High-trusters appeared better equipped than low-trusters to detect
cheating when presented with a social contract Wason scenario characterized by a high
degree of social uncertainty and opportunity cost. However, when the Wason scenario
presented a much more stable social environment, the trust effect went away. These
results are consistent with Yamagishi’s argument that levels of trust are calibrated by the
interaction of an individual with his social environment (Yamagishi, Kikuchi, & Kosugi,
1999). Under conditions of social uncertainty and high opportunity cost, developing a
high degree of generalized trust acts as a social lubricant, motivating individuals to enter
into social exchange with strangers. However, given the unpredictable nature of such an
environment, it would be essential to be vigilant of the potential to be exploited. Thus, if
high-trusters are more familiar with and better adapted to such unpredictable
environments, they should outperform low-trusters when presented with the task of
detecting cheaters under such conditions. On the other hand, if trust and cheater
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detection are less important in a social environment characterized by low levels of
uncertainty and opportunity cost, high-trusters will lose their performance advantage.
The second analysis of Study 3 tested a causal model in which social intelligence
was responsible for calibrating both generalized trust and the CDM. The results were not
consistent with this hypothesis. Social intelligence failed to significantly predict
generalized trust scores and Wason performance. Three potential reasons exist for these
null findings. First, the Tromso social intelligence scale was originally published in
Italian and there have been a limited number of studies validating the scale in English.
Second, social intelligence as a construct is ill defined and significant disagreement exists
regard its usefulness as a construct. Given the fragmentary nature of social intelligence
research and the lack o f a consistent operational definition with a well established
measurement tool, it is often a problematic construct to apply (Landy, 2006). Finally, it
may be the case that social intelligence is unrelated to the development of generalized
trust and cheater detection. Neither Yamagishi’s SEH or the connection between
generalized trust and the CDM hinge on social intelligence being a common causative
factor. In fact, there may be no need to evoke an additional construct at all when
hypothesizing about the development of the SEH or the CDM. Indeed, SCT specifically
proposes that the CDM is a cognitive mechanism designed, that is, pre-equipped, with the
necessary “algorithms” to perform its task (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). The very idea of
an evolved cognitive module or mental organ implies that it is automatically sensitive to a
certain domain of information (i.e. the domain of social exchange).
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General Discussion
The current study found mixed results in regard to its central focus: the
integration of the SEH and SCT. Generalized trust was found to moderate cheater
detection in the predicted direction - high-trusters .were better at solving social contract
Wason tasks than low-trusters. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the
CDM is influenced by generalized levels of trust. In addition, socio-cultural context was
found to moderate the relationship between generalized trust and Wason performance,
suggesting that environmental cues may adaptively calibrate generalized trust and the
CDM. Despite replicating Yamagishi’s sensitivity-to-information effect, levels of
suspicion were not related to Wason performance, indicating that vigilance and cheater
detection may be separate constructs.

Finally, social intelligence was not found to be

predictive of generalized trust or cheater detection, results that are inconsistent with the
causal model proposed by Yamagishi.
Despite mixed findings, the pattern of results suggests that the SEH and the CDM
are linked in an adaptive way. Specifically, the results are consistent with the prediction
that generalized trust seems to be calibrated by one’s socio-cultural environment, which
in turn influences the activation of the CDM within social exchanges. The SEH predicts
that generalized trust is regulated by two social exchange variables: social uncertainty
and opportunity costs (Kiyonari, Tanida, & Yamagishi, 2000). High levels of generalized
trust are fostered when social uncertainty and opportunity costs are high (such as in the
United States). These high levels of trust are meant to facilitate exchange between
potential interaction partners. At the same time, Yamagishi argues that given the
unpredictable nature of such an environment, one must be particularly vigilant of
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exploitation. As such, high-trusters also have to be more sensitive to cues to a potential
interaction partner’s untrustworthiness. Yamagishi does not hypothesize about a
particular mechanism by which this vigilance occurs. However, it is presently
hypothesized that, consistent with SCT, it is the CDM that facilitates the enhanced
detection of cheaters. Although evidence for a direct causal path between generalized
trust, suspicion scores, and cheater detection was not found in the current study, cheater
detection appears to be closely linked to the relationship between socio-cultural context
and generalized trust. For example, in an environment characterized by high social
uncertainty and high opportunity cost, high generalized trust and accurate cheater
detection are particularly beneficial. This is precisely what the results of Study 3 support.
High-trusters significantly outperformed low-trusters in the detection of cheaters when
they were presented with a Wason task characterized by high social uncertainty and
opportunity cost. The benefits of high generalized trust and its subsequent enhanced
cheater detection disappeared when participants were asked to solve a Wason task
characterized by low-levels of social uncertainty and opportunity cost.
Implications fo r Social Exchange Theory and the Social Exchange Heuristic
The results of the current study have implications for both SCT and the SEH.
Since its development, SCT has sought to uncover the design features of the hypothesized
CDM. However, research has focused entirely on the external cues that activate the
CDM - the presence of a social contract. However, the current research identifies an
additional, developmental, design feature o f the CDM. That is, the CDM may have
evolved to be sensitive to consistent patterns of social relationships within an individual’s
environment. Levels of social uncertainty and opportunity cost and their subsequent
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effect on generalized trust act to fine tune one’s ability to detect cheating. Put simply, if
highly accurate cheater detection ability is needed, more cognitive resources are invested
in its development. However, if one’s environment is relatively stable and predictable,
resources may be invested elsewhere.
In regards to the SEH, the present results suggest that Yamagishi’s adoption of the
goal/expectancy framework was valid. When looked at in conjunction with his research,
the present study argues for a connection between the motivation to cooperate (strong
SEH) and the ability to detect cheaters. However, Yamagishi’s sensitivity-to-information
effect, which provided the impetus for many of his later predictions, did not appear to be
related to cheater detection. Although it intuitively makes sense that those who are more
suspicious of other’s trustworthiness would excel at the detection of cheaters, there is no
theoretical reason why this would be the case. The activation of the GDM is not
hypothesized to be a conscious process, and as such, there is no reason that it need be
associated with identifiable behavioral markers, such as increased suspiciousness.
Conclusion
As Yamagishi (1998) suggests, the relationship between the SEH and the CDM is
best captured by the goal/expectation theory of cooperation (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977). To
achieve consistent mutual cooperation within a social exchange, two conditions have to
be met. First, individuals have to be motivated to abandon the strict pursuit of selfinterest and adopt the goal of mutual cooperation. Second, to protect from the costs of
exploitation, individuals must be capable o f detecting cheaters. The SEH, which is
hypothesized to facilitate cooperative interaction, results in the adoption of mutual benefit
as a goal. Once that has been established individuals need a way to ensure that their
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exchange partner will cooperate as well. The CDM is responsible for solving this
adaptive problem. As the results of Yamagishi and the current author suggest, trust is a
component o f the goal/expectation model. As levels of generalized trust increase, both
the goal and expectation of mutual cooperation become stronger (a stronger SEH) and
consequently the CDM becomes more finely tuned to an environment where the potential
to be exploited is more prevalent.
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Table 1
Mean Trust Scores by Condition
Social Contract

Non-Social Contract

M

SD

M

SD

Wason Correct

45.82

7.99

43.95

12.87

Wason Incorrect

42.29

7.50

46.72

6.90
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Table 2
Variables Predicting Wason Performance
Step 1
*

Step 2

P

S.E

Generalized Trust

0.318

4.095

P
0.001

P

S.E.
4.257

0.025

0.689
-0.242

P
<.001

Contrast 1

-0.258

4.293

3.619

0.013

Contrast 2

6.432

0.318

0.006

0.262

5.422

0.007

Trust X Cl

n/a

n/a

n/a

-0.752

<.001

n/a

n/a

n/a

0.515

3.619
5.694

Trust X C2

<.001

Note. Contrast 1 = negative information vs. positive/neutral information; Contrast 2 =
positive information vs. neutral information.
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Table 3
Mean Suspicion Scores by Condition
Neutral Information

Negative Information

Positive Information

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

High Trust

162.00

27.75

85.56

28.77

194.00

24.59

Low Trust

75.56

22.97

130.00

12.25

103.33

32.04
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Table 4
Path Coefficients for Moderated Mediational Model
Overall Model
Path
A
Path
B

Negative Info

Neutral Info

Positive Info
p

(3

S.E.

p

P

S.E.

p

P

S.E.

p

p

S.E.

0.332

0.090

<.001

0.581

0.084

<.001

0.374

0.117

<.01

0.796

0.170

<.001

0.245

0.237

>.05

0.331

0.761

>.05

0.059

0.498

>.05

.401

0.480

>.05

Note. Path A = Predicting suspicion scores from generalized trust; Path B = Predicting
Wason performance from suspicion scores while controlling for generalized trust.
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Table 5
Mean Trust Scores by Condition
LC

HC

M

SD

M

SD

Wason Correct

46.41

6.44

49.44

7.81

Wason Incorrect

48.19

8.74

41.4

4.82
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Model predicting that generalized trust moderates the relationship between
social exchange and cheater detection ability.
Figure 2. Interactive effects of generalized trust and Wason version on Wason
performance.
Figure 3. Model Predicting that information type moderates the relationship between
generalized trust and level of suspicion.
Figure 4. Interactive effects of generalized trust and information type on Wason
performance.
Figure 5. Model predicting that information type moderates the mediation o f generalized
trust and cheater detection by level of suspicion.
Figure 6. Model predicting that socio-cultural context moderates the relationship between
generalized trust and cheater detection ability.
Figure 7. Interactive effects of generalized trust and socio-cultural context on Wason
performance.
Figure 8. Model predicting that generalized trust mediates the relationship between social
intelligence and cheater detection ability.
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Appendix A - Study 1 Materials
Social Contract Wason Task
Imagine you are a member of your county’s Board of Education, supervising four
volunteers who work for the Board. Part of your job is to double-check the assignment of
students to the appropriate school by these volunteers, who are supposed to follow certain rules
for assigning students from various towns to the appropriate school district.
Students are to be assigned either to Grover High School, which is located in Grover
City, or to Hanover High School, which is located in the town of Hanover. It is important that
certain rules for assigning students from various towns to the appropriate school district are
followed, because parents would much rather have their children attend Grover High than
Hanover High. Grover High is a great school with an excellent record for getting students placed
in good colleges. In contrast, Hanover High is a mediocre school with poor teachers and decrepit
facilities.
The Board of Education took these factors into account when it created rules to determine
which school a student is to be assigned to. The most important of these rules is:
“If a student is to be assigned to Grover High School, then that student
must live in Grover City.”
Each volunteer is the parent of a teenager who is about to enter high school, and each
processed his own child’s document. The volunteers were supposed to follow this rule when
processing all student documents— including the documents of their own children. It is your job
to make sure that the volunteers did not deliberately break the rule when assigning their own
children to high schools.
Imagine the boxes below represent cards that have information about the documents of
the four volunteer’s children. Each card represents the child of one volunteer. One side of a card
tells what school the volunteer assigned to their child, and the other side of the card tells what
town that student lives in. Please circle “yes” on only those card(s) you definitely need to turn
over to see if the documents of any of these students violate the rule and circle “no” for the cards
that do not need to be turned over.

Grover School

yes

no

Town of Hanover

yes

no

Hanover School

yes

no

Grover City

yes

no
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Non-Social Contract Wason Task
Imagine you are a member of your county’s Board of Education, supervising four
volunteers who work for the Board. Part of your job is to double-check the assignment of
students to the appropriate school by these volunteers, who are supposed to follow certain rules
for assigning students from various towns to the appropriate school district.
Students are to be assigned either to Grover High School, which is located in Grover
City, or to Hanover High School, which is located in the town of Hanover. It is important that
certain rules for assigning students from various towns to the appropriate school district are
followed, because the population statistics they provide allow the Board of Education to decide
how many teachers need to be assigned to each school. If these rules are not followed some
schools could end up with too many teachers, and other schools with too few.
The Board of Education took these factors into account when it created rules to determine
which school a student is to be assigned to. The most important of these rules is:
“If a student is to be assigned to Grover High School, then that student
must live in Grover City.”
Your volunteers were supposed to follow this rule when processing all student
documents. However, mistakes can happen. It is your job to make sure that the volunteers did
not inadvertently break the rule when assigning any students to high schools.
Imagine the boxes below represent cards that have information about the documents of
four children. Each card represents one child. One side of a card tells what school the volunteer
assigned the child to, and the other side o f the card tells what town that student lives in. Please
circle “yes” on only those card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see if the documents of any
of these students violate the rule and circle “no” for the cards that do not need to be turned over.

Grover School

yes

no

Town of Hanover

yes

no

Hanover School

yes

no

Grover City

yes

no
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Yamagishi Generalized Trust Scale
Directions: Indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each statement by
using the following scale:
1 = strongly agree
2 = moderately agree
3 = mildly agree
4 = agree and disagree equally
5 = mildly disagree
6 = moderately disagree
7 = strongly disagree
1. Most people are basically honest.
1
2
3
4
5
2. Most people are trustworthy.
1
2
3
4

6

5

7

6

7

3. People always think about their own gain.
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

4. Most people trust a person if the person trusts them.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
5. In today’s society, if you are not careful, people will use you.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
6. In today’s society, we do not have to worry about being used by someone.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
7. Most people are basically good-natured and kind.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8. Most people trust others.
1
2
3
4

5

6

7

9. Most people really do not like to make the effort to help others.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
10. If we assume everyone has the capacity to be malicious, we will not be in trouble.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
11. Generally, I trust others.
1
2
3
4

5

6

7
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Appendix B - Study 2 Materials
Neutral Suspicion Scenario
Directions: Please read the following three scenarios carefully and respond to the
questions as accurately as possible.
Scenario 1:
Nate, an American traveling abroad, stayed three nights in a London hotel. Upon
checking out, Nate realized he was only charged for one night. The hotel was very busy
and Nate knew that if he didn’tspeak up, the hotel clerk would not catch the mistake.
What is the probability that Nate will notify the hotel clerk that he hasbeen undercharged
for the room?
0% 10%
20% 30% 40%
50% 60%
70% 80% 90%
100%
Scenario 2:
Matt has just finished up lunch at his favorite restaurant. After paying in cash, the
waiter returns with matt’s change. Matt notices that the waiter has miscounted the
change, leaving him too much money. The waiter did not realize his mistake and Matt
knows that he will be able to get away with the extra change if he wants.
What is the probability that matt will notify the waiter that he has been given too much
change?
0% 10%
20% 30% 40%
50% 60%
70% 80% 90%
100%
Scenario 3:
John has just purchased a new car with the basic warranty. Once home, John
noticed that the dealership had unknowingly given him the extended warranty without
tacking on any extra charges to his bill. Since the contract had been signed, John knew
that the dealership had to honor the upgraded warranty even though John didn’t pay for it.
What is the probability that John will notify the dealership that he has accidentally been
given the extended warranty?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
100%
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Positive Suspicion Scenario
Directions: Please read the following three scenarios carefully and respond to the
questions as accurately as possible.
Scenario 1:
Nate, an American traveling abroad, stayed three nights in a London hotel. The
hotel is very busy and Nate had to wait in line to check out. While in line, Nate allowed
an el'derly guest to cut in front of him. Upon checking out, Nate noticed he was only
charged for one night. Since the hotel was very busy, Nate realized that if he didn’t
speak up, the hotel clerk would never catch the mistake.
What is the probability that Nate will notify the hotel clerk that he has been
undercharged for the room?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% ’ 80% 90%
100%
Scenario 2:
Matt has just finished up lunch at his favorite restaurant. Before settling his bill,
Matt goes to the bathroom to wash his hands. On the way back to his table Matt picks up
a piece o f trash on the floor and throws it away. After paying in cash, the waiter returns
with m att’s change. He notices that the waiter has miscounted the change, leaving him
too much money. The waiter did not realize his mistake and Matt knows that he will be
able to get away with the extra change if he wants.
What is the probability that matt will notify the waiter that he has been given too
much change?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
100%
Scenario 3:
John has just purchased a new car with the basic warranty. While driving home in
his new car John allowed an impatient driver to pass him on the freeway. Once home,
John noticed that the dealership had unknowingly given him the extended warranty
without tacking on any extra charges to his bill. Since the contract had been signed, John
knew that the dealership had to honor the upgraded warranty even though John didn’t pay
for it.
What is the probability that John will notify the dealership that he has accidentally
been given the extended warranty?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
100%
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Negative Suspicion Scenario
Directions: Please read the following three scenarios carefully and respond to the
questions as accurately as possible.
Scenario 1:
Nate, an American traveling abroad, stayed three nights in a London hotel. The
hotel is very busy and Nate had to wait in line to check out. Instead of getting in the back
of the line, Nate cut in front of another hotel guest. Upon checking out, Nate noticed he
was only charged for one night. Since the hotel was very busy, Nate realized that if he
didn’t speak up the hotel clerk would never catch the mistake.
What is the probability that Nate will notify the hotel clerk that he has been
undercharged for the room?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
100%
Scenario 2:
Matt has just finished up lunch at his favorite restaurant. Before settling his bill,
Matt goes to the bathroom to wash his hands. On the way back to his table Matt empties
out the trash in his pockets onto the restaurant floor. After paying in cash, the waiter
returns with matt’s change. He notices that the waiter has miscounted the change,
leaving him too much money. The waiter did not realize his mistake and Matt knows that
he will be able to get away with the extra change if he wants.
What is the probability that matt will notify the waiter that he has been given too
much change?
0% 10%
20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
90%
100%
Scenario 3:
John has just purchased a new car with the basic warranty. While driving home in
his new car John cuts off a slower driver on the highway. Once home, John noticed that
the dealership had unknowingly given him the extended warranty without tacking on any
extra charges to his bill. Since the contract had been signed, John knew that the
dealership had to honor the upgraded warranty even though John didn’t pay for it.
What is the probability that John will notify the dealership that he has accidentally
been given the extended warranty?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
100%
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Appendix C - Study 3 Materials
Tromso Social Intelligence Scale
Directions: Indicate the degree to which the statements below describe you by using the
following scale:
1 = Describes me poorly
2
3
4
5
6
7 = Describes me extremely well
1 .1 can predict other peoples’ behavior.
1
2
3
4
5

6

7

2 . 1 often feel that it is difficult to understand other’s choices.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
3 . 1 know how my actions will make others feel.
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

4 . 1 often feel uncertain around new people who I don’t know.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
5. People often surprise me with the things they do.
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
6 . 1 understand other peoples’ feelings.
1
2
3
4
5
7 .1 fit in easily in social situations.
1
2
3
4

5

6

6

7

7

8. Other people become angry with me without me being able to explain why.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
9 . 1 understand others’ wishes.
1
2
3
4

5

6

7

1 0 .1 am good at entering new situations and meeting people for the first time.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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11. It seems as though people are often angry or irritated with me when I say what I
think.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
12.1 have a hard time getting along with other people.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
13.1 find people unpredictable.
1
2
3
4

5

6

7

14 .1 can often understand what others are trying to accomplish without the need for them
to say anything.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
15. It takes a long time to get to know others well.
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

16. I have often hurt others without realizing it.
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

17.1 can predict how others will react to my behavior.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
18.1 am good at getting on good terms with new people.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1 9 .1 can often understand what others really mean through their expression, body
language, etc..
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2 0 .1 frequently have problems finding good conversation topics.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
21.1 am often surprised by others’ reactions to what I do.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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HC Wason Task
Imagine you are a member of a small community in Thailand that specializes in
the processing of raw rubber into simple products. It is your job to travel to a large
market several miles away in order to purchase raw rubber for your community. The
buying of raw rubber is a difficult task because it is nearly impossible to determine the
quality of the rubber until after it is processed and manufactured. Since the quality of the
finished product is highly dependent on the quality of raw rubber used, purchasing high
quality raw rubber is of vital importance for the livelihood of your community.
The market has many different raw rubber merchants, and none of them offer
guarantees on their product. To make matters worse, the raw rubber trade is a volatile
business with new merchants coming and going all the time.
To help ensure that raw rubber merchants do not attempt to cheat their customers
the market has the following rule in place:
“I f rubber is to be sold for a high price, then it m ust be o f a high quality.”

Despite this rule, many merchants tend to over-price low quality raw rubber,
knowing that it is nearly impossible to detect. On this particular occasion you are
comparing the raw rubber from four different merchants. It is your task to make sure that
none of the bundles you are interested in have been over-priced.
Imagine the boxes below represent cards that have information about the raw
rubber of four merchants. Each card represents information for one merchant. One side
of a card tells the price of the rubber, and the other side of the card tells the quality of the
raw rubber. Please circle “yes” on only those card(s) you definitely need to turn over to
see if any of the merchants violated the rule and circle “no” for the cards that do not need
to be turned over.
High Price

Low Price

yes

yes

no

no

High Quality

yes

no

Low Quality

yes

no
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LC Wason Task
Imagine you are a member of a small community in Thailand that specializes in
the processing of raw rubber into simple products. It is your job to travel to a large
market several miles away in order to purchase raw rubber for your community. The
buying of raw rubber is a difficult task because it is nearly impossible to determine the
quality of the rubber until after it is processed and manufactured. Since the quality of the
finished product is highly dependent on the quality of raw rubber used, purchasing high
quality raw rubber is of vital importance for the livelihood of your community.
To ensure that your community only gets high quality raw rubber, you have
formed a long-standing relationship with a single raw rubber merchant. You have dealt
with this single merchant for several years and have resisted the temptation to purchase
cheaper raw rubber, of unknown quality, from other merchants.
You and this particular rubber merchant have a rule in place to ensure that the raw
rubber you purchase for your community is of a high quality. The rule is as follows:
“I f rubber is to be sold for a high price, then it m ust be o f a high quality.”

On this particular occasion the raw rubber merchant you have formed a
relationship with has four bundles of rubber. They are priced differently and you are not
certain why. It is your task to make sure that none of the bundles you are interested in
have been over-priced.
Imagine the boxes below represent cards that have information about the four
bundles of raw rubber. Each card represents information for one bundle. One side of a
card tells the price of the rubber, and the other side of the card tells the quality of the
rubber. Please circle “yes” on only those card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see if
any of the bundles of raw rubber violate the rule and circle “no” for the cards that do not
need to be turned over.
High Price

Low Price

yes

yes

no

no

High Quality

yes

no

Low Quality

yes

no
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